Constitutional Background
For more than 235 years, a national investment in the future has been part of For more than 235 years, a national investment in the future has been part of the formal social contract of the United States, providing patent rights limited in the formal social contract of the United States, providing patent rights limited in time and scope in exchange for a full and timely disclosure of new and useful innotime and scope in exchange for a full and timely disclosure of new and useful innovations. The US Constitution in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 expressly empowers vations. The US Constitution in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 expressly empowers Congress to manage this investment by establishing a patent system. The constiCongress to manage this investment by establishing a patent system. The constitutional design of the US patent system recognizes that the marketplace tends to tutional design of the US patent system recognizes that the marketplace tends to undersupply knowledge, particularly when up-front costs of discovery or developundersupply knowledge, particularly when up-front costs of discovery or development are high and marginal costs of copying are low. A period of limited exclusivity ment are high and marginal costs of copying are low. A period of limited exclusivity is meant to provide an incentive to make such investments. is meant to provide an incentive to make such investments.
Accordingly, the revealed national preference of the United States has been Accordingly, the revealed national preference of the United States has been to forgo some immediate economic benefi t in favor of creating incentives for new to forgo some immediate economic benefi t in favor of creating incentives for new generations of advances in scientifi c knowledge and technological application. generations of advances in scientifi c knowledge and technological application. There is a natural tendency for innovation-which requires investment for longThere is a natural tendency for innovation-which requires investment for longterm benefi t-to interfere with access in the form of consumption in the short term. term benefi t-to interfere with access in the form of consumption in the short term. But even in the here and now, this constitutionally protected ability of innovators But even in the here and now, this constitutionally protected ability of innovators in the United States to leverage their patent rights for attracting investment capital, in the United States to leverage their patent rights for attracting investment capital, creating jobs, and expanding into new markets refl ects a preference for ensuring creating jobs, and expanding into new markets refl ects a preference for ensuring that individuals and small start-up fi rms have an opportunity to thrive and grow. To that individuals and small start-up fi rms have an opportunity to thrive and grow. To be sure, patent rights are only part of a suite of legal and nonlegal appropriability be sure, patent rights are only part of a suite of legal and nonlegal appropriability options available to innovators. Still, patents have been a useful and oft-used means options available to innovators. Still, patents have been a useful and oft-used means of protecting innovations since the country's inception. of protecting innovations since the country's inception.
The Patent Offi ce Role
The US Patent and Trademark Offi ce's primary responsibility is to support the The US Patent and Trademark Offi ce's primary responsibility is to support the innovation system by examining patent and trademark applications. In the US system, innovation system by examining patent and trademark applications. In the US system, patents on mechanical, electronic, and chemical technologies are generally "utility patents on mechanical, electronic, and chemical technologies are generally "utility patents." Utility patent applications submitted to the Patent Offi ce by inventors may patents." Utility patent applications submitted to the Patent Offi ce by inventors may cover processes, machines, articles of manufacture, or compositions of matter. Upon cover processes, machines, articles of manufacture, or compositions of matter. Upon being accepted as complete, applications are given a technology classifi cation and being accepted as complete, applications are given a technology classifi cation and assigned to an examiner group. Patent examiners are specialized technology employees assigned to an examiner group. Patent examiners are specialized technology employees with training and experience in various science and engineering backgrounds related with training and experience in various science and engineering backgrounds related to different kinds of inventions. Examiners are also public offi cers who have a legal to different kinds of inventions. Examiners are also public offi cers who have a legal duty to grant a patent so long as the inventor has met the requirements for patentduty to grant a patent so long as the inventor has met the requirements for patentability set by Congress and the federal courts. In fact, Congress demands that " [a] ability set by Congress and the federal courts. In fact, Congress demands that " [a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless" the examiner is able to fi nd a basis to person shall be entitled to a patent unless" the examiner is able to fi nd a basis to refuse the application. To fi nd possible bases for rejection, the examiner compares refuse the application. To fi nd possible bases for rejection, the examiner compares the claimed invention to the existing state of knowledge as refl ected in the prior art, the claimed invention to the existing state of knowledge as refl ected in the prior art, consisting of patent documents and the scientifi c and commercial literature. consisting of patent documents and the scientifi c and commercial literature.
Because a patent is a series of claims that defi ne the scope of the invention, Because a patent is a series of claims that defi ne the scope of the invention, an examiner uses the results of that search to determine whether these claims an examiner uses the results of that search to determine whether these claims delineate what the law demands: that the invention be new, useful, and adequately delineate what the law demands: that the invention be new, useful, and adequately described and enabled. A legally suffi cient claim must also be nonobvious to described and enabled. A legally suffi cient claim must also be nonobvious to persons "having ordinary skill in the art" of the invention, so as to encourage persons "having ordinary skill in the art" of the invention, so as to encourage inventions that will serve the cumulative advancement of technology at the froninventions that will serve the cumulative advancement of technology at the frontiers of knowledge. tiers of knowledge.
Through such search and examination of the application, examiners serve the Through such search and examination of the application, examiners serve the public by clearing out patent claims that do not meet these legal requirements. public by clearing out patent claims that do not meet these legal requirements. Their labor is highly complex and knowledge-intensive, since it requires both Their labor is highly complex and knowledge-intensive, since it requires both scientifi c and legal understanding. In 2011, the Patent Offi ce received over 500,000 scientifi c and legal understanding. In 2011, the Patent Offi ce received over 500,000 applications. applications.
The most fundamental and important contribution the Patent Offi ce makes to The most fundamental and important contribution the Patent Offi ce makes to improving the patent system involves focusing on, and investing in, higher-quality improving the patent system involves focusing on, and investing in, higher-quality and more timely processing of patent applications (US Patent and Trademark Offi ce and more timely processing of patent applications (US Patent and Trademark Offi ce 2010). In this context, "quality" refers to patent claims being clearly defi ned and 2010). In this context, "quality" refers to patent claims being clearly defi ned and consistently interpreted under the law, and "timeliness" encompasses a reduction consistently interpreted under the law, and "timeliness" encompasses a reduction in delays and pendency during examination. Both goals reduce uncertainty, and in delays and pendency during examination. Both goals reduce uncertainty, and allow for more effi cient investment and transactions in the market for innovation. allow for more effi cient investment and transactions in the market for innovation. Scholars have consistently supported these goals to improve the operation of the Scholars have consistently supported these goals to improve the operation of the innovation system (National Research Council 2004) . innovation system (National Research Council 2004) .
Economic Research
This focus on reducing uncertainty-an economic concept-raises an imporThis focus on reducing uncertainty-an economic concept-raises an important question about what role the patent system plays in economic growth. It is clear tant question about what role the patent system plays in economic growth. It is clear that a substantial share of national growth in the United States has been driven by that a substantial share of national growth in the United States has been driven by innovation and the deployment of new technologies, which have, in turn, produced innovation and the deployment of new technologies, which have, in turn, produced higher standards of living along with better, longer lives for people. Economists higher standards of living along with better, longer lives for people. Economists have struggled over the years to discover what role intellectual property rights play have struggled over the years to discover what role intellectual property rights play in the supply of innovation and the productivity improvements and economic in the supply of innovation and the productivity improvements and economic growth that new technologies have ushered in. The task has been made diffi cult by growth that new technologies have ushered in. The task has been made diffi cult by endogeneity problems, in that patenting is correlated with other important drivers endogeneity problems, in that patenting is correlated with other important drivers of performance. Good instruments to help us untangle this complexity are rare to of performance. Good instruments to help us untangle this complexity are rare to nonexistent, and apart from some fi ne historical examples (Moser 2005) , increasing nonexistent, and apart from some fi ne historical examples (Moser 2005) , increasing international harmonization of patent laws minimizes the opportunity to observe international harmonization of patent laws minimizes the opportunity to observe the results of natural experiments in the real world. the results of natural experiments in the real world.
That said, a body of economic research has demonstrated a positive role for That said, a body of economic research has demonstrated a positive role for patenting in economic performance. Gould and Gruben (1996) , for instance, patenting in economic performance. Gould and Gruben (1996) , for instance, utilize cross-country data on patent protection to fi nd that intellectual property utilize cross-country data on patent protection to fi nd that intellectual property protection is a signifi cant determinant of economic growth. Branstetter and Saggi protection is a signifi cant determinant of economic growth. Branstetter and Saggi (2011) contribute to this general fi nding, showing that increased intellectual (2011) contribute to this general fi nding, showing that increased intellectual property protection in developing countries leads to more inbound foreign direct property protection in developing countries leads to more inbound foreign direct investment, a greater local production share of the global basket of goods, and investment, a greater local production share of the global basket of goods, and higher real wages for local labor. higher real wages for local labor.
The mechanisms through which patent rights work to drive growth have also The mechanisms through which patent rights work to drive growth have also been a subject of research. In addition to the classical view that intellectual property been a subject of research. In addition to the classical view that intellectual property rights provide an incentive to create knowledge (Arrow 1962), scholars have found rights provide an incentive to create knowledge (Arrow 1962), scholars have found that the issuing of patents is a signifi cant determinant of commercializing inventhat the issuing of patents is a signifi cant determinant of commercializing inventions through licensing (Gans, Hsu, and Stern 2008) . This latter view is consistent tions through licensing (Gans, Hsu, and Stern 2008) . This latter view is consistent with work on the role of intellectual property rights in providing a transactional with work on the role of intellectual property rights in providing a transactional platform that facilitates a more effi cient transfer of knowledge assets and gains from platform that facilitates a more effi cient transfer of knowledge assets and gains from trade in the markets for technology (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2004) . trade in the markets for technology (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2004) .
At the level of the fi rm, too, patents have been found to have an economiAt the level of the fi rm, too, patents have been found to have an economically and statistically signifi cant impact on fi rm-level productivity and market value cally and statistically signifi cant impact on fi rm-level productivity and market value (Bloom and Van Reenen 2002) . Evidence provided by several surveys of managers at (Bloom and Van Reenen 2002) . Evidence provided by several surveys of managers at technology fi rms supports the notion that patents are valuable and serve a range of technology fi rms supports the notion that patents are valuable and serve a range of purposes, in preventing copying, earning profi ts, and engaging in effective technology purposes, in preventing copying, earning profi ts, and engaging in effective technology competition. In a survey of research and development managers at fi rms across the competition. In a survey of research and development managers at fi rms across the US economy, researchers discovered that patents are widely used by fi rms in industry US economy, researchers discovered that patents are widely used by fi rms in industry and are routinely cited as being important for profi ting from innovation, although not and are routinely cited as being important for profi ting from innovation, although not ubiquitously so (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000) . The respondents suggested that ubiquitously so (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000) . The respondents suggested that when patents were used, they served heterogeneous purposes, including protecting when patents were used, they served heterogeneous purposes, including protecting inventions from copying, earning licensing revenues, supporting negotiations, and inventions from copying, earning licensing revenues, supporting negotiations, and enhancing reputation. A more recent survey of young technology startups basically enhancing reputation. A more recent survey of young technology startups basically confi rmed these fi ndings, although the respondents commonly cited the importance confi rmed these fi ndings, although the respondents commonly cited the importance of building patent portfolios to facilitate inward capital investment and increasing the of building patent portfolios to facilitate inward capital investment and increasing the likelihood of successful exit events such as initial public offerings and acquisitions by likelihood of successful exit events such as initial public offerings and acquisitions by other fi rms (Graham, Merges, Samuelson, and Sichelman 2009) . other fi rms (Graham, Merges, Samuelson, and Sichelman 2009) .
While a growing body of evidence fi nds that patent protection supports innovaWhile a growing body of evidence fi nds that patent protection supports innovation and growth, some critics contend that the patent system should be dismantled tion and growth, some critics contend that the patent system should be dismantled wholesale. However, large systematic changes of the kind advocated by these wholesale. However, large systematic changes of the kind advocated by these critics are best interpreted in light of Oliver Williamson's (2009) "remediableness" critics are best interpreted in light of Oliver Williamson's (2009) "remediableness" criterion, to wit: an existing practice for which no superior feasible alternative can criterion, to wit: an existing practice for which no superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented with expected net gain is presumed to be effi cient. be described and implemented with expected net gain is presumed to be effi cient. Without strong evidence of the superiority of such a large change in the instituWithout strong evidence of the superiority of such a large change in the institutional environment in which innovation and economic activity occurs, a "do away tional environment in which innovation and economic activity occurs, a "do away with patents" alternative cannot be fairly categorized as a hypothetical ideal. And with patents" alternative cannot be fairly categorized as a hypothetical ideal. And even if, even if, arguendo, such an alternative were hypothetically ideal, the large transaction , such an alternative were hypothetically ideal, the large transaction costs associated with moving an innovation system and an economy to this new equicosts associated with moving an innovation system and an economy to this new equilibrium would have to be considered in netting out the possible gains. Advocates for librium would have to be considered in netting out the possible gains. Advocates for this view have made little progress in carrying either of these very heavy burdens. this view have made little progress in carrying either of these very heavy burdens.
The Patent System Has Faced and Still Faces Problems Arising from New Technologies and Uncertainty in Legal Treatment
The view that society would do better by rejecting patent incentives as both The view that society would do better by rejecting patent incentives as both unnecessary and obstructing to knowledge consumption in the short term is closely unnecessary and obstructing to knowledge consumption in the short term is closely related to criticisms that have been made regarding the patent infringement related to criticisms that have been made regarding the patent infringement litigation of recent years among fi rms in the smart phone industry. Such arguments litigation of recent years among fi rms in the smart phone industry. Such arguments suggest that these so-called "smart phone wars" arise from overbroad and impropsuggest that these so-called "smart phone wars" arise from overbroad and improperly issued software patents, and thus refl ect fl aws in patent eligibility doctrine, a erly issued software patents, and thus refl ect fl aws in patent eligibility doctrine, a too-permissive treatment at the Patent Offi ce of software patents, and economic too-permissive treatment at the Patent Offi ce of software patents, and economic waste in litigation. Such criticisms are not new. They commonly refl ect the recurwaste in litigation. Such criticisms are not new. They commonly refl ect the recurring diffi culty the patent system has experienced when facing the legal and market ring diffi culty the patent system has experienced when facing the legal and market uncertainty associated with the eruption of discontinuous technological change. uncertainty associated with the eruption of discontinuous technological change.
History is a guide to us in this regard, since over time the United States patent History is a guide to us in this regard, since over time the United States patent system has been met with new challenges in technology and industrial organization, system has been met with new challenges in technology and industrial organization, but has adapted. At times, the resolution has come legislatively, as in the 1836 patent but has adapted. At times, the resolution has come legislatively, as in the 1836 patent act. Under the 1793 patent statute, patent examination was not just permissive, it act. Under the 1793 patent statute, patent examination was not just permissive, it was nonexistent: the Patent Offi ce granted any patent properly applied for, leaving was nonexistent: the Patent Offi ce granted any patent properly applied for, leaving to society and the courts the costs of clarifying patent rights through piecemeal to society and the courts the costs of clarifying patent rights through piecemeal litigation. To mitigate the social costs, the 1836 patent act reintroduced substantive litigation. To mitigate the social costs, the 1836 patent act reintroduced substantive examination of patent applications for novelty and utility. examination of patent applications for novelty and utility.
In this century, important changes in the patent law intended to deal with the In this century, important changes in the patent law intended to deal with the demands of a changing innovation environment have occurred in 1930, demands of a changing innovation environment have occurred in 1930, 1 1 in 1952, in 1952, 2 2 in 1970, in 1970, 3 3 in 1982, in 1982, 4 4 in 1994, in 1994, 5 5 in 1999, in 1999, 6 6 and again recently in the sweeping changes and again recently in the sweeping changes required in the 2011 America Invents Act (which we discuss below). Often the change required in the 2011 America Invents Act (which we discuss below). Often the change has come about because of compelling factual circumstances, such as regional or has come about because of compelling factual circumstances, such as regional or national economic concerns or even the exigencies of war. Such changes have been national economic concerns or even the exigencies of war. Such changes have been messy and with contradiction, and often against the backdrop of patent litigation messy and with contradiction, and often against the backdrop of patent litigation around the valuable technologies at stake. But a well-developed economic history around the valuable technologies at stake. But a well-developed economic history suggests that this is what we should expect when institutional systems supporting suggests that this is what we should expect when institutional systems supporting economic activity respond to new circumstances (North 1981) . economic activity respond to new circumstances (North 1981) .
In the history of the United States, society has repeatedly celebrated seminal In the history of the United States, society has repeatedly celebrated seminal inventions while bemoaning the patent disputes that emerged around them. For inventions while bemoaning the patent disputes that emerged around them. For example, Eli Whitney patented the mechanical cotton gin in 1794, ushering in huge example, Eli Whitney patented the mechanical cotton gin in 1794, ushering in huge productivity gains, but was unable to prevent wholesale infringement for many years productivity gains, but was unable to prevent wholesale infringement for many years since local juries, who resented Whitney for taking large royalties from farmers, since local juries, who resented Whitney for taking large royalties from farmers, would rule against him. It was not until the patent law was amended in 1800 that would rule against him. It was not until the patent law was amended in 1800 that Whitney's legal rights were vindicated, and even then with limited economic reward. Whitney's legal rights were vindicated, and even then with limited economic reward.
A half-century later, when Elias Howe in 1846 patented his eye-pointed needle A half-century later, when Elias Howe in 1846 patented his eye-pointed needle sewing machine, contributing to productivity gains and new economic freedoms sewing machine, contributing to productivity gains and new economic freedoms for women, it began a period of extensive litigation among industry rivals. In for women, it began a period of extensive litigation among industry rivals. In response to moves like those of Isaac Singer, who tried unsuccessfully to invalidate response to moves like those of Isaac Singer, who tried unsuccessfully to invalidate the Howe patent, the legal landscape changed again, with the emergence in 1856 the Howe patent, the legal landscape changed again, with the emergence in 1856 of one of the fi rst US patent pools, in which major producers cross-licensed their of one of the fi rst US patent pools, in which major producers cross-licensed their mutually blocking patents. Notably, Howe was not himself a manufacturer of sewing mutually blocking patents. Notably, Howe was not himself a manufacturer of sewing machines, but rather a patent-holder interested in licensing his invention-by machines, but rather a patent-holder interested in licensing his invention-by modern standards, a nonpracticing entity. modern standards, a nonpracticing entity.
Another half-century later, Orville and Wilbur Wright patented the wing and Another half-century later, Orville and Wilbur Wright patented the wing and steering designs of their fl ying machine, in 1906, and showed their work to the Aerial steering designs of their fl ying machine, in 1906, and showed their work to the Aerial Experiment Association, founded the following year by another celebrated inventor Experiment Association, founded the following year by another celebrated inventor and well-known patent litigant, Alexander Graham Bell. Having refused a license and well-known patent litigant, Alexander Graham Bell. Having refused a license from Glenn Curtiss for his engine, the Wrights were soon mired in litigation when from Glenn Curtiss for his engine, the Wrights were soon mired in litigation when airplanes built by Curtiss and other industry players that infringed on the Wright airplanes built by Curtiss and other industry players that infringed on the Wright brothers' steering patents met with commercial and reputational success. While the brothers' steering patents met with commercial and reputational success. While the infringement dispute ended with a verdict for the Wrights, the broader business infringement dispute ended with a verdict for the Wrights, the broader business dispute was resolved only when Assistant Navy Secretary Franklin Roosevelt in 1917 dispute was resolved only when Assistant Navy Secretary Franklin Roosevelt in 1917 pressured the rivals to allow unrestricted production of airplanes for the war effort. pressured the rivals to allow unrestricted production of airplanes for the war effort. The scale of the dispute was larger than ever, but the lessons of the sewing machine The scale of the dispute was larger than ever, but the lessons of the sewing machine wars had not been lost, and the airplane patents were cross-licensed through a patent wars had not been lost, and the airplane patents were cross-licensed through a patent pool administered by Manufacturer's Aircraft Association. pool administered by Manufacturer's Aircraft Association.
Still another half-century later, in 1957, Columbia University student Gordon Still another half-century later, in 1957, Columbia University student Gordon Gould made some rough calculations and a sketch in his notebook of the fi rst Gould made some rough calculations and a sketch in his notebook of the fi rst LASER (that is, Light Amplifi cation by Stimulated Emission of Radiation). Gould LASER (that is, Light Amplifi cation by Stimulated Emission of Radiation). Gould soon left Columbia for a private research fi rm, and other scientists independently soon left Columbia for a private research fi rm, and other scientists independently developed the same technology about three months after Gould, igniting a 30-year developed the same technology about three months after Gould, igniting a 30-year series of disputes. When Gould ultimately prevailed, the controversy over invention series of disputes. When Gould ultimately prevailed, the controversy over invention priority gave way to industry resistance during the 1970s and 1980s to the enforcepriority gave way to industry resistance during the 1970s and 1980s to the enforcement of Gould's patents that had been pending as applications for long periods of ment of Gould's patents that had been pending as applications for long periods of time. Such so-called "submarine" patents can be problematic in instances like lasers, time. Such so-called "submarine" patents can be problematic in instances like lasers, where the patented technology becomes widely adopted across industries without where the patented technology becomes widely adopted across industries without fi rms knowing that fundamental patents exist. fi rms knowing that fundamental patents exist. As before, the system righted itself, As before, the system righted itself, in this instance by reducing the ability of inventors to "submarine" their inventions, in this instance by reducing the ability of inventors to "submarine" their inventions, in 1995 by changing the measurement and length of the patent term, and in 1999 in 1995 by changing the measurement and length of the patent term, and in 1999 by publishing patent applications 18 months after fi ling. by publishing patent applications 18 months after fi ling. Now, again about 50 years later after the struggles over the laser, we are embroiled Now, again about 50 years later after the struggles over the laser, we are embroiled in the smart phone wars. When we take the long view, this controversy does not look in the smart phone wars. When we take the long view, this controversy does not look like a dispute for the ages, but instead a kind of controversy that has arisen periodilike a dispute for the ages, but instead a kind of controversy that has arisen periodically throughout the history of the US innovation system. The resolution of each cally throughout the history of the US innovation system. The resolution of each crisis has been a refi nement and reform of the patent law to meet modern needs, crisis has been a refi nement and reform of the patent law to meet modern needs, particularly as innovation has over time commanded increasing priority to national particularly as innovation has over time commanded increasing priority to national economic health. That same recalibration appears to be at work in how the system is economic health. That same recalibration appears to be at work in how the system is dealing with smart phone patents. In fact, fair examination of the available evidence dealing with smart phone patents. In fact, fair examination of the available evidence shows that the smart phone patent wars are not about low-quality software patents, shows that the smart phone patent wars are not about low-quality software patents, nor about errors in software patent examination or issuance. nor about errors in software patent examination or issuance.
Smart Phone Wars and "Software Patents:" Some Empirical Evidence
The smart phone patent wars have produced a large number of US lawsuits The smart phone patent wars have produced a large number of US lawsuits involving major industry players like Samsung, Google's Motorola Mobility diviinvolving major industry players like Samsung, Google's Motorola Mobility division, and Apple, with many counterpart suits fi led overseas. Yet across these many sion, and Apple, with many counterpart suits fi led overseas. Yet across these many lawsuits involving smart phones, some important questions have gone unanswered. lawsuits involving smart phones, some important questions have gone unanswered. How credible are the lawsuits? How far have these suits progressed, and how many How credible are the lawsuits? How far have these suits progressed, and how many patents are actually involved? And, given that many critics have suggested the patents are actually involved? And, given that many critics have suggested the culprit is low-quality software patents, what technologies were actually covered by culprit is low-quality software patents, what technologies were actually covered by the patents involved, and how did the patents fare? the patents involved, and how did the patents fare?
In attempting to answer these questions, we examined the US patents involved In attempting to answer these questions, we examined the US patents involved in some of the high-profi le litigation among four major fi rms in the smart phone in some of the high-profi le litigation among four major fi rms in the smart phone industry: Motorola, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung. While 133 patents were initially industry: Motorola, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung. While 133 patents were initially asserted across 13 lawsuits, a substantial share was dismissed from the cases and, as asserted across 13 lawsuits, a substantial share was dismissed from the cases and, as of November 2012, only 73 patents remained in controversy. A technology expert at of November 2012, only 73 patents remained in controversy. A technology expert at the Patent Offi ce reviewed these 73 patents, determining whether any of the claims the Patent Offi ce reviewed these 73 patents, determining whether any of the claims could be fairly characterized as involving "software" inventions. We found that 65 could be fairly characterized as involving "software" inventions. We found that 65 of the patents included at least one software-related claim. Thus, while many of of the patents included at least one software-related claim. Thus, while many of the patents asserted in the Motorola, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung suits involved the patents asserted in the Motorola, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung suits involved software claims, not all of the claims were to software elements, and in fact some of software claims, not all of the claims were to software elements, and in fact some of the patents asserted had no software elements at all. This fi nding is not surprising, the patents asserted had no software elements at all. This fi nding is not surprising, as smart phones contain much innovation beyond software-for example, display as smart phones contain much innovation beyond software-for example, display technology, microprocessor technology, signal processing technology, signal transtechnology, microprocessor technology, signal processing technology, signal transmission technology, and compression technology. mission technology, and compression technology.
Of the 65 software patents still involved in this litigation, thus far only 21 of Of the 65 software patents still involved in this litigation, thus far only 21 of them-less than one-third-have received court decisions of the type that provide them-less than one-third-have received court decisions of the type that provide some indication of their validity or likely validity. Of those, only four patents have some indication of their validity or likely validity. Of those, only four patents have had decisions indicating they are invalid or likely invalid. The remaining 17 software had decisions indicating they are invalid or likely invalid. The remaining 17 software patents evaluated so far in these cases have been declared by a court to be valid or patents evaluated so far in these cases have been declared by a court to be valid or likely valid. This 80 percent favorability ratio is not consistent with the pronouncelikely valid. This 80 percent favorability ratio is not consistent with the pronouncements that the smart phone wars are being driven by low-quality software patents. In ments that the smart phone wars are being driven by low-quality software patents. In fact, this rate of validity determinations compares favorably with other technology fact, this rate of validity determinations compares favorably with other technology areas. In summary, the US federal district courts, which are the principal reviewers areas. In summary, the US federal district courts, which are the principal reviewers of Patent Offi ce decision-making, are fi nding in a large share of these cases that of Patent Offi ce decision-making, are fi nding in a large share of these cases that prior Patent Offi ce examinations of the software patents involved in the smart prior Patent Offi ce examinations of the software patents involved in the smart phone litigation have been completed properly. phone litigation have been completed properly.
While that fi nding is positive, we were interested in digging deeper and asking While that fi nding is positive, we were interested in digging deeper and asking other relevant questions. The recent US Supreme Court case of other relevant questions. The recent US Supreme Court case of Bilski v. Kappos (130 S. Ct. 3218 [2010] ), which overturned a lower-court ruling that patents needed (130 S. Ct. 3218 [2010] ), which overturned a lower-court ruling that patents needed to involve a machine (or apparatus) and/or a transformation of an article to a to involve a machine (or apparatus) and/or a transformation of an article to a different state or thing, has implications for the patent-eligibility of software and is different state or thing, has implications for the patent-eligibility of software and is but the latest in a series of reminders that this area of law continues to evolve. The but the latest in a series of reminders that this area of law continues to evolve. The Patent Offi ce will continue to reassess its granting and legal treatments of patents Patent Offi ce will continue to reassess its granting and legal treatments of patents that include software elements. that include software elements.
The patenting of software has created much controversy, and the underlying The patenting of software has created much controversy, and the underlying arguments go back long before courts in the 1980s and 1990s affi rmed patentarguments go back long before courts in the 1980s and 1990s affi rmed patenteligibility for software and, relatedly, for patents for "business methods" (Graham eligibility for software and, relatedly, for patents for "business methods" (Graham and Mowery 2003) . Since as early as the Morse telegraph patent disputes in the and Mowery 2003). Since as early as the Morse telegraph patent disputes in the 1840s, the US patent system has grappled with abstract ideas such as mathematical 1840s, the US patent system has grappled with abstract ideas such as mathematical principles and laws of nature on the one hand, and implementations of these ideas principles and laws of nature on the one hand, and implementations of these ideas on the other-particularly in nascent technologies where both scientifi c and legal on the other-particularly in nascent technologies where both scientifi c and legal uncertainty is high. In rejecting one part of Samuel Morse's patent claim-the uncertainty is high. In rejecting one part of Samuel Morse's patent claim-the part concerning the use of electromagnetic power for marking characters at any part concerning the use of electromagnetic power for marking characters at any distance-the US Supreme Court in distance-the US Supreme Court in O'Reilly v. Morse (56 US 62 [1853] ) noted (56 US 62 [1853] ) noted that Morse had described and enabled only the use of galvanic repeater circuits that Morse had described and enabled only the use of galvanic repeater circuits to preserve a signal over long distances. Without disclosing and teaching more, to preserve a signal over long distances. Without disclosing and teaching more, the Court found, his patent could not cover future applications of electromagnetic the Court found, his patent could not cover future applications of electromagnetic force: he could claim his way of transmitting signals, but not force: he could claim his way of transmitting signals, but not signal transmission itself. . This emphasis on knowledge diffusion and the patent This emphasis on knowledge diffusion and the patent quid pro quo, particu-, particularly in emerging and legally uncertain technological environments, has remained larly in emerging and legally uncertain technological environments, has remained integral in US patent law to rewarding particular innovative solutions to problems integral in US patent law to rewarding particular innovative solutions to problems without foreclosing the problems themselves. Similarly, the patent law leaves availwithout foreclosing the problems themselves. Similarly, the patent law leaves available to the public the intellectual tools that follow-on innovators can use to solve able to the public the intellectual tools that follow-on innovators can use to solve such problems. such problems.
In the context of software inventions, these principles have been applied by the In the context of software inventions, these principles have been applied by the US Supreme Court. It has denied patent-eligibility to bare algorithms for converting US Supreme Court. It has denied patent-eligibility to bare algorithms for converting binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numerals ( binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numerals (Gottschalk v. Benson, , 409 US 63 [1972] ) and for smoothing fl uctuations in process variable trends ( 409 US 63 [1972] ) and for smoothing fl uctuations in process variable trends (Parker v. Flook, 437 US 584 [1978] ), but affi rmed patent-eligibility for the physical imple-, 437 US 584 [1978] ), but affi rmed patent-eligibility for the physical implementation by a rubber-molding press of the Arrhenius equation ( mentation by a rubber-molding press of the Arrhenius equation (Diamond v. Diehr, , 450 US 175 [1981] ). At the Patent Offi ce, the examining of patent applications for 450 US 175 [1981] ). At the Patent Offi ce, the examining of patent applications for software-related inventions has emphasized, through exacting review of the written software-related inventions has emphasized, through exacting review of the written description and enabling disclosure of the application, that the invention as claimed description and enabling disclosure of the application, that the invention as claimed must be commensurate with the invention as taught to the public. must be commensurate with the invention as taught to the public.
Before examining data on patenting of software inventions, fi rst comes a defiBefore examining data on patenting of software inventions, fi rst comes a definitional question: What is a software patent, and can we identify it? As any patent nitional question: What is a software patent, and can we identify it? As any patent examiner can confi rm, applications across virtually all major technology areas can examiner can confi rm, applications across virtually all major technology areas can include software elements, and among economic researchers, no common defi niinclude software elements, and among economic researchers, no common defi nition has emerged for conducting empirical analysis (Layne-Farrar 2005) . Part of the tion has emerged for conducting empirical analysis (Layne-Farrar 2005) . Part of the diffi culty stems from software having some of the characteristics of a general purpose diffi culty stems from software having some of the characteristics of a general purpose technology. As outlined by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) , these technologies technology. As outlined by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) , these technologies are "pervasive," being widely adopted across many technologies and heterogeneous are "pervasive," being widely adopted across many technologies and heterogeneous sectors in the economy. In fact, one way in which researchers measure "generality" sectors in the economy. In fact, one way in which researchers measure "generality" in empirical analyses of patenting is to examine how widely adopted patents are in in empirical analyses of patenting is to examine how widely adopted patents are in later, heterogeneous patented technologies (Hall and Trajtenberg 2004) . Related to later, heterogeneous patented technologies (Hall and Trajtenberg 2004) . Related to such pervasiveness, an accurate "software patent" defi nition is elusive because many such pervasiveness, an accurate "software patent" defi nition is elusive because many patents have software elements mixed with non-software elements. patents have software elements mixed with non-software elements.
While the relatively small number of patents involved in the smart phone wars While the relatively small number of patents involved in the smart phone wars allowed us, above, to employ an expert to read the claims, that method is neither allowed us, above, to employ an expert to read the claims, that method is neither reproducible nor feasible for large-scale empirical analyses. We therefore relied on reproducible nor feasible for large-scale empirical analyses. We therefore relied on methods commonly used in the prior literature to identify "software patents," by methods commonly used in the prior literature to identify "software patents," by employing patent classifi cations (Graham and Mowery 2003; Hall and MacGarvie employing patent classifi cations (Graham and Mowery 2003; Hall and MacGarvie 2010) . Still, identifying patents with software elements can be a tricky business. 2010). Still, identifying patents with software elements can be a tricky business.
To conduct the following analyses in this paper, Patent Offi ce experts examined To conduct the following analyses in this paper, Patent Offi ce experts examined all US patent classes and subclasses and determined which were likely to contain all US patent classes and subclasses and determined which were likely to contain patents applications or issued patents containing some element of either general patents applications or issued patents containing some element of either general purpose software or software that is specifi c to some form of hardware. purpose software or software that is specifi c to some form of hardware. 7 7 While this While this defi nition will certainly be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, the method is defi nition will certainly be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, the method is calibrated to help us identify classes in which patents with software claims are most calibrated to help us identify classes in which patents with software claims are most likely to be found. As shorthand, we refer to those applications or patents which fall likely to be found. As shorthand, we refer to those applications or patents which fall into these classes and subclasses as "software" applications or patents, and to those into these classes and subclasses as "software" applications or patents, and to those which fall outside as "non-software," with the understanding that this nomenclature which fall outside as "non-software," with the understanding that this nomenclature is one of convenience, and will not be accurate in all cases. is one of convenience, and will not be accurate in all cases.
Having a defi nition of convenience in hand, we can then proceed to some Having a defi nition of convenience in hand, we can then proceed to some questions. How does our rejection rate for software applications compare with questions. How does our rejection rate for software applications compare with that of applications in the other technologies? Conversely, how does our rate of that of applications in the other technologies? Conversely, how does our rate of allowance on a fi rst-action by the examiner compare with that of applications allowance on a fi rst-action by the examiner compare with that of applications in the other technologies? How often are our examiners' rejection decisions in the other technologies? How often are our examiners' rejection decisions upheld by our board of patent appeals (the principal reviewer within the Patent upheld by our board of patent appeals (the principal reviewer within the Patent Offi ce of examiners' denying patent protection)? How has our reviewing court, Offi ce of examiners' denying patent protection)? How has our reviewing court, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, treated our rejection decisions the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, treated our rejection decisions compared with our own board of patent appeals? In other words, when the board compared with our own board of patent appeals? In other words, when the board of patent appeals upholds examiner rejections, how does the US Court of Appeals of patent appeals upholds examiner rejections, how does the US Court of Appeals treat those determinations? treat those determinations?
First, as regards fi nal rejections, the Patent Offi ce used to reject software appliFirst, as regards fi nal rejections, the Patent Offi ce used to reject software applications at a higher rate than non-software applications, as shown in Figure 1 . Ten cations at a higher rate than non-software applications, as shown in Figure 1 . Ten years ago, the rate of fi nal rejection for software applications was 38.4 percent, years ago, the rate of fi nal rejection for software applications was 38.4 percent, 2.8 percentage points higher than for non-software applications. Over time, the 2.8 percentage points higher than for non-software applications. Over time, the fi nal rejection rates for both software and non-software applications had risen, fi nal rejection rates for both software and non-software applications had risen, exceeding 60 percent by 2009. Thereafter, these rates declined to below 55 percent. exceeding 60 percent by 2009. Thereafter, these rates declined to below 55 percent.
Figure 1 Share of US Patent Offi ce First Final Actions that Were Rejections, FY 2003-FY 2012
Source: Authors. Notes: After an examiner initially rejects claims as unpatentable and the applicant responds with arguments or amendments, the examiner issues a "fi nal action:" either an allowance or rejection. This is termed a "fi rst fi nal action" because the applicant may seek continued examination, leading to further iterations of nonfi nal and fi nal actions subsequent to the "fi rst" one. , rejections were more likely for software applications than for non-software applications by were more likely for software applications than for non-software applications by an average difference of just 1.4 percentage points. These annual differences were an average difference of just 1.4 percentage points. These annual differences were signifi cant at the 95 percent confi dence interval for every year observed except signifi cant at the 95 percent confi dence interval for every year observed except 2006, 2007, and 2010 . Cumulatively, rejections were more likely for software 2006, 2007, and 2010 . Cumulatively, rejections were more likely for software applications than for non-software applications by a difference of 2.4 percentage applications than for non-software applications by a difference of 2.4 percentage points, signifi cant at the 95 percent confi dence interval. The fi nal rejection rate points, signifi cant at the 95 percent confi dence interval. The fi nal rejection rate for software applications in 2012 is 53.1 percent, only 0.7 percentage points higher for software applications in 2012 is 53.1 percent, only 0.7 percentage points higher than for non-software applications, again a difference signifi cant at the 95 percent than for non-software applications, again a difference signifi cant at the 95 percent confi dence interval. Over the last decade, it appears that there has been relatively confi dence interval. Over the last decade, it appears that there has been relatively little difference in the treatment of software and non-software patent application little difference in the treatment of software and non-software patent application rejections in the Patent Offi ce. rejections in the Patent Offi ce.
As a comparison, we also examine the likelihood that a patent application As a comparison, we also examine the likelihood that a patent application will be allowed during the fi rst action on the merits by the examiner during fi scal will be allowed during the fi rst action on the merits by the examiner during fi scal years 2003 through 2012. As illustrated in Figure 2 , while fi rst-action allowances years 2003 through 2012. As illustrated in Figure 2 , while fi rst-action allowances were sometimes more, and sometimes less, likely for software patents than for nonwere sometimes more, and sometimes less, likely for software patents than for nonsoftware patents, the annual differences were small, and signifi cant at the 95 percent software patents, the annual differences were small, and signifi cant at the 95 percent confi dence interval for 2006-2008 and 2010-2012 . Cumulatively during the entire confi dence interval for 2006-2008 and 2010-2012 . Cumulatively during the entire period, these fi rst-action allowances were less likely for software applications than period, these fi rst-action allowances were less likely for software applications than for non-software applications by a difference of 0.5 percentage points, signifi cant at for non-software applications by a difference of 0.5 percentage points, signifi cant at the 95 percent confi dence interval. Over the last decade, it again appears that there the 95 percent confi dence interval. Over the last decade, it again appears that there has been relatively little difference in the treatment of software and non-software has been relatively little difference in the treatment of software and non-software patent application allowances in the Patent Offi ce. patent application allowances in the Patent Offi ce. Several different explanations could account for these trends, particularly Several different explanations could account for these trends, particularly the recent decline in fi nal rejection rates. One is that the Patent Offi ce's focus on the recent decline in fi nal rejection rates. One is that the Patent Offi ce's focus on more compact and effective interaction between the applicant and the examiner more compact and effective interaction between the applicant and the examiner has resulted in dispositions without the need for fi nal rejections. Another is that has resulted in dispositions without the need for fi nal rejections. Another is that guidelines, best practices, and outreach to the applicant community regarding guidelines, best practices, and outreach to the applicant community regarding obviousness, written description, and other examination issues have resulted in obviousness, written description, and other examination issues have resulted in higher-quality applications being fi led in the fi rst place, a selection effect that would higher-quality applications being fi led in the fi rst place, a selection effect that would result in fewer fi nal rejections. result in fewer fi nal rejections.
But one explanation that the evidence does not support is that fewer fi nal rejecBut one explanation that the evidence does not support is that fewer fi nal rejections refl ect low-quality examination by the Patent Offi ce. In fact, data from Patent tions refl ect low-quality examination by the Patent Offi ce. In fact, data from Patent Offi ce internal quality assurance reviews on nearly 29,000 random examination Offi ce internal quality assurance reviews on nearly 29,000 random examination audits over six years show that, for both software and non-software applications, audits over six years show that, for both software and non-software applications, the overwhelming majority of allowances and fi nal rejections correctly apply the the overwhelming majority of allowances and fi nal rejections correctly apply the patent laws and examination standards. Allowances across both software and nonpatent laws and examination standards. Allowances across both software and nonsoftware applications were correctly issued over 95 percent of the time each of the software applications were correctly issued over 95 percent of the time each of the last six years. Final rejections across both software and non-software applications in last six years. Final rejections across both software and non-software applications in 2012 were correctly issued about 96 percent of the time, increasing meaningfully 2012 were correctly issued about 96 percent of the time, increasing meaningfully from 90 percent six years prior. Figure 3 shows that cumulatively, over the same from 90 percent six years prior. Figure 3 shows that cumulatively, over the same 
Final rejections
Allowances Type of final examiner action six years, allowances for software applications were correctly issued in 96.8 percent six years, allowances for software applications were correctly issued in 96.8 percent of cases and for non-software applications in 96.5 percent of the cases, Similarly, of cases and for non-software applications in 96.5 percent of the cases, Similarly, fi nal rejections for software applications were correctly issued in 93.6 percent of the fi nal rejections for software applications were correctly issued in 93.6 percent of the cases and for non-software applications in 93.5 percent of the cases. These differcases and for non-software applications in 93.5 percent of the cases. These differences in allowance and fi nal rejection are not statistically signifi cant, showing that ences in allowance and fi nal rejection are not statistically signifi cant, showing that software applications are being examined in the same manner as applications in all software applications are being examined in the same manner as applications in all other technologies, and upon independent review, examiners are found to have other technologies, and upon independent review, examiners are found to have correctly followed all laws and regulations in a very high percentage of the cases. correctly followed all laws and regulations in a very high percentage of the cases.
We 2008 -2012, show that the board of patent appeals affi rms (in whole or in part) our examiners' rejections of software applications affi rms (in whole or in part) our examiners' rejections of software applications in 57.0 percent of cases, about 2.2 percentage points higher than the rate of in 57.0 percent of cases, about 2.2 percentage points higher than the rate of affi rmance for denial decisions across other technologies. This share shows a affi rmance for denial decisions across other technologies. This share shows a narrowing of the difference between software and non-software compared with narrowing of the difference between software and non-software compared with 2003 -2007 , when the board of patent appeals affi rmed non-software rejections 2003 -2007 , when the board of patent appeals affi rmed non-software rejections notably more often than software rejections, with statistically signifi cant annual notably more often than software rejections, with statistically signifi cant annual differences at the 95 percent confi dence interval. In 2008, the affi rmance rate differences at the 95 percent confi dence interval. In 2008, the affi rmance rate for software application appeals was essentially the same as with the overall rate, for software application appeals was essentially the same as with the overall rate, and has since declined more slowly than the affi rmance rate among non-software and has since declined more slowly than the affi rmance rate among non-software application appeals. The affi rmance rate among software appeals is currently application appeals. The affi rmance rate among software appeals is currently 8.2 percentage points higher than that of other technologies, signifi cant at the 8.2 percentage points higher than that of other technologies, signifi cant at the 95 percent confi dence interval. 95 percent confi dence interval. As yet another institutional check on the work being completed at the Patent As yet another institutional check on the work being completed at the Patent Offi ce, Congress has mandated that the decisions of the board of patent appeals Offi ce, Congress has mandated that the decisions of the board of patent appeals can be submitted for review by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. can be submitted for review by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. We also examined these federal-court appeals, and while there are relatively We also examined these federal-court appeals, and while there are relatively few instances in which the US Court of Appeals has substantively evaluated the few instances in which the US Court of Appeals has substantively evaluated the rejection of software applications, that court has upheld such rejections in over rejection of software applications, that court has upheld such rejections in over 95 percent of the cases during 2003 -2012. Cumulatively, the decisions of the 95 percent of the cases during 2003 -2012. Cumulatively, the decisions of the US Court of Appeals on cases appealed from the Patent Offi ce board of patent US Court of Appeals on cases appealed from the Patent Offi ce board of patent appeals have not meaningfully differed as regards the review of software and appeals have not meaningfully differed as regards the review of software and non-software applications. non-software applications.
These data demonstrate that it is not fair to conclude the Patent Offi ce is These data demonstrate that it is not fair to conclude the Patent Offi ce is "soft" on software patent applications. In fact, our investigation of rejection rates "soft" on software patent applications. In fact, our investigation of rejection rates shows that Patent Offi ce software application rejections are proper, as judged by shows that Patent Offi ce software application rejections are proper, as judged by comparison to other technology areas as well as when reviewed by our board of comparison to other technology areas as well as when reviewed by our board of patent appeals. Moreover, the work of Patent Offi ce examiners is being upheld by a patent appeals. Moreover, the work of Patent Offi ce examiners is being upheld by a wide margin in the US federal courts that review their decision making. wide margin in the US federal courts that review their decision making.
Our analysis thus does not provide support for the statements many have made Our analysis thus does not provide support for the statements many have made concerning the origin of the smart phone patent wars and the work of the Patent concerning the origin of the smart phone patent wars and the work of the Patent Offi ce. But that is not to say that the US Patent and Trademark Offi ce believes Offi ce. But that is not to say that the US Patent and Trademark Offi ce believes all is perfect in the world of software patents. There are things the Patent Offi ce all is perfect in the world of software patents. There are things the Patent Offi ce should address, and is addressing, principally through the implementation of the should address, and is addressing, principally through the implementation of the America Invents Act of 2011, the most sweeping patent reform legislation in at least America Invents Act of 2011, the most sweeping patent reform legislation in at least a generation. a generation.
The America Invents Act as an Intervention
The America Invents Act of 2011 was the outcome of major compromise, and The America Invents Act of 2011 was the outcome of major compromise, and thus a source of both satisfaction and disappointment to all parties. Taken as a thus a source of both satisfaction and disappointment to all parties. Taken as a whole, the act in both substance and implementation addresses a host of issues whole, the act in both substance and implementation addresses a host of issues raised by software patent critics. Among the provisions especially applicable to softraised by software patent critics. Among the provisions especially applicable to software inventions are the new laws enabling individuals and fi rms to challenge the ware inventions are the new laws enabling individuals and fi rms to challenge the validity of issued patents. These "post-grant" challenge options include: post-grant validity of issued patents. These "post-grant" challenge options include: post-grant review, review, inter partes (or third party) review, and "covered business method" patents (or third party) review, and "covered business method" patents review. These challenge procedures are handled by a panel of administrative judges, review. These challenge procedures are handled by a panel of administrative judges, each of whom is highly skilled in both technology and patent-law issues. Moreover, each of whom is highly skilled in both technology and patent-law issues. Moreover, all three options are statutorily mandated to be completed in one year, thereby all three options are statutorily mandated to be completed in one year, thereby offering substantial cost savings over litigation and ensuring resolution of validity offering substantial cost savings over litigation and ensuring resolution of validity disputes far faster than possible in the federal courts. This speedy resolution of disputes far faster than possible in the federal courts. This speedy resolution of controversies is particularly relevant to the software industry where product life controversies is particularly relevant to the software industry where product life cycles are often measured in months, not years. Furthermore, the Patent Offi ce cycles are often measured in months, not years. Furthermore, the Patent Offi ce regulations implementing all three options are built on a common streamlined regulations implementing all three options are built on a common streamlined platform to promote simplicity, speed, and cost-effectiveness, all critical to software platform to promote simplicity, speed, and cost-effectiveness, all critical to software innovators of any size who may want to contest patents. innovators of any size who may want to contest patents.
In the new process of post-grant opposition, patents can be challenged on In the new process of post-grant opposition, patents can be challenged on all grounds, including eligibility and clarity. The new "covered business method" all grounds, including eligibility and clarity. The new "covered business method" review procedure will also be useful in the software area, since it allows a party actureview procedure will also be useful in the software area, since it allows a party actually sued, or threatened with suit on any existing business method patent (no matter ally sued, or threatened with suit on any existing business method patent (no matter how recently issued), to challenge its validity. Also, in interpreting the meaning how recently issued), to challenge its validity. Also, in interpreting the meaning of "business methods" under the new statute, the Patent Offi ce has adopted an of "business methods" under the new statute, the Patent Offi ce has adopted an inclusive interpretation of that term to ensure that business methods implemented inclusive interpretation of that term to ensure that business methods implemented in software are eligible for review. in software are eligible for review.
The The inter partes, or third-party submission, allows any member of the public , or third-party submission, allows any member of the public to participate by submitting documents and commentary for use by patent examto participate by submitting documents and commentary for use by patent examiners. Because deep knowledge is commonly housed in the electronic records of iners. Because deep knowledge is commonly housed in the electronic records of software experts outside the Patent Offi ce, this provision can help ensure patent software experts outside the Patent Offi ce, this provision can help ensure patent examiners have access to the most relevant documents when examining software examiners have access to the most relevant documents when examining software patent applications. Again, the Patent Offi ce has implemented the third-party patent applications. Again, the Patent Offi ce has implemented the third-party submission provision in a simple, streamlined, and open fashion, providing an submission provision in a simple, streamlined, and open fashion, providing an Internet-enabled path for third parties to make submissions at no cost for the fi rst Internet-enabled path for third parties to make submissions at no cost for the fi rst three or fewer documents. three or fewer documents.
In these and other ways, the America Invents Act seeks to address many of the In these and other ways, the America Invents Act seeks to address many of the principal concerns surrounding software patent quality, approaching them in new principal concerns surrounding software patent quality, approaching them in new and powerful ways. While the law continues to take effect, the Patent Offi ce has and powerful ways. While the law continues to take effect, the Patent Offi ce has been using the fl exibility it has within its operational and regulatory scope to grant been using the fl exibility it has within its operational and regulatory scope to grant only valid software-related patents. only valid software-related patents.
The Patent Offi ce: Responsibilities and Responses
Among the core drivers of software patent quality, there are perhaps two overAmong the core drivers of software patent quality, there are perhaps two overarching considerations: 1) the correspondence between the scope of the patent arching considerations: 1) the correspondence between the scope of the patent disclosure-the explanation of what was invented and how it works; and 2) the disclosure-the explanation of what was invented and how it works; and 2) the scope of the patent claims-the boundaries of the legal protection provided to scope of the patent claims-the boundaries of the legal protection provided to the patentee. For the patent bargain to work, to incentivize rather than to inhibit the patentee. For the patent bargain to work, to incentivize rather than to inhibit innovation, legal protection must be commensurate with scope of disclosure. innovation, legal protection must be commensurate with scope of disclosure. Otherwise, an inventor who describes only one way to solve a problem may obtain Otherwise, an inventor who describes only one way to solve a problem may obtain patent coverage for many ways, or all ways, to solve the problem. Worse yet, a patent patent coverage for many ways, or all ways, to solve the problem. Worse yet, a patent that describes no clear problem and solution does society no good at all. Those that describes no clear problem and solution does society no good at all. Those who work at the Patent Offi ce struggle every day to get this correspondence right, who work at the Patent Offi ce struggle every day to get this correspondence right, and see it as a primary responsibility. and see it as a primary responsibility.
While the disclosure-claim balance must be struck across all inventions in all While the disclosure-claim balance must be struck across all inventions in all fi elds, it has proven particularly diffi cult in the software area, where terminology has fi elds, it has proven particularly diffi cult in the software area, where terminology has tended to shift and can be imprecise, and where functional language is frequently tended to shift and can be imprecise, and where functional language is frequently used to describe ideas that themselves are inherently functional in nature (leading used to describe ideas that themselves are inherently functional in nature (leading to a kind of "generalization on generalization" phenomenon). Moreover, during to a kind of "generalization on generalization" phenomenon). Moreover, during the 1990s while software patent fi lings were escalating, the courts as well as the the 1990s while software patent fi lings were escalating, the courts as well as the Patent Offi ce were primarily focused on other parts of the patentability equation, Patent Offi ce were primarily focused on other parts of the patentability equation, and less on the tight correspondence between disclosure and claims. and less on the tight correspondence between disclosure and claims.
More recently, participants in the patent system have paid renewed attenMore recently, participants in the patent system have paid renewed attention to disclosure-claim correspondence. Courts have issued a series of decisions tion to disclosure-claim correspondence. Courts have issued a series of decisions strengthening requirements, and the Patent Offi ce has increased the time allotted strengthening requirements, and the Patent Offi ce has increased the time allotted to examiners for each patent application review while providing them with the to examiners for each patent application review while providing them with the training and tools to place more focus on disclosure requirements. In a further training and tools to place more focus on disclosure requirements. In a further move, the Patent Offi ce issued specifi c internal guidelines focusing examiners on move, the Patent Offi ce issued specifi c internal guidelines focusing examiners on disclosure clarity and claim-disclosure correspondence. Patent Offi ce review of disclosure clarity and claim-disclosure correspondence. Patent Offi ce review of examiner actions shows an increase in the incidence of examiners raising clarity examiner actions shows an increase in the incidence of examiners raising clarity and claim-disclosure correspondence issues. More training, measurement, and and claim-disclosure correspondence issues. More training, measurement, and refi nement is underway to ensure continued improvement. refi nement is underway to ensure continued improvement.
Along with the disclosure-claim correspondence, another vital component in Along with the disclosure-claim correspondence, another vital component in ensuring that only appropriate software patents are issued is the strong applicaensuring that only appropriate software patents are issued is the strong application by examiners of the legal doctrine of "obviousness." Obviousness governs the tion by examiners of the legal doctrine of "obviousness." Obviousness governs the circumstances under which a patent applicant's claim, judged against the body of circumstances under which a patent applicant's claim, judged against the body of relevant prior art documents predating a patent application, is merely obvious or an relevant prior art documents predating a patent application, is merely obvious or an advance that merits patent protection. Here again, key court decisions during the advance that merits patent protection. Here again, key court decisions during the last several years have signifi cantly changed the law in a direction enabling tighter last several years have signifi cantly changed the law in a direction enabling tighter examination practices by the Patent Offi ce. The seminal case was the Supreme examination practices by the Patent Offi ce. The seminal case was the Supreme Court's decision in Court's decision in KSR Int 'l Co. v. Telefl ex, Inc. (550 US 398 [2007] ) in which the (550 US 398 [2007] ) in which the Court rejected a narrow, rigid conception of obviousness, and instead set forth a Court rejected a narrow, rigid conception of obviousness, and instead set forth a broader set of inquiries to fi nd whether patent claims should be treated as obvious. broader set of inquiries to fi nd whether patent claims should be treated as obvious.
The The KSR decision, along with subsequent cases in the courts, have enabled decision, along with subsequent cases in the courts, have enabled patent examiners to consider software-related claims more carefully, taking patent examiners to consider software-related claims more carefully, taking advantage of the analogous nature of so much software and the ability of skilled advantage of the analogous nature of so much software and the ability of skilled programmers to draw from separate algorithms in creating new solutions. And the programmers to draw from separate algorithms in creating new solutions. And the Patent Offi ce has taken advantage of the heightened standard by developing approPatent Offi ce has taken advantage of the heightened standard by developing appropriate examination guidelines, educating examiners to use them, and ensuring priate examination guidelines, educating examiners to use them, and ensuring usage. The goal is to produce more technical prior art available for examiners to usage. The goal is to produce more technical prior art available for examiners to apply, more appropriate ways to apply it, and ultimately the granting of software apply, more appropriate ways to apply it, and ultimately the granting of software patents that more accurately refl ect substantial innovation. patents that more accurately refl ect substantial innovation.
A Systemic Approach to Patent System Health
With these changes duly noted, there remains concern about an overhang of With these changes duly noted, there remains concern about an overhang of patents that were issued in the past. While some of the provisions of the America patents that were issued in the past. While some of the provisions of the America Invents Act-such as expanded post-grant review-may help, policy advocates have Invents Act-such as expanded post-grant review-may help, policy advocates have made other legislative and judicial proposals. Some have called upon Congress to made other legislative and judicial proposals. Some have called upon Congress to expand the new "covered business method review" to include software, thereby expand the new "covered business method review" to include software, thereby giving competitors the opportunity to use evidence that has come to light in recent giving competitors the opportunity to use evidence that has come to light in recent years to challenge existing patents in a quick and cheap administrative hearing. years to challenge existing patents in a quick and cheap administrative hearing. Others are proposing the SHIELD Act that would adopt an English rule of costOthers are proposing the SHIELD Act that would adopt an English rule of costshifting in litigation, thus putting the cost burden of defending a suit on the loser shifting in litigation, thus putting the cost burden of defending a suit on the loser and creating disincentives to enforce low-quality patents. Similarly, courts continue and creating disincentives to enforce low-quality patents. Similarly, courts continue to be asked to act on issues such as enhanced scrutiny of patent claims and experito be asked to act on issues such as enhanced scrutiny of patent claims and experimentation safe harbors, among others. mentation safe harbors, among others.
While the Patent Offi ce has not taken an offi cial position on these recomWhile the Patent Offi ce has not taken an offi cial position on these recommendations, these ongoing disputes do refl ect a reality that the patent system is mendations, these ongoing disputes do refl ect a reality that the patent system is just that-a system. Different institutions work together to produce it. The Patent just that-a system. Different institutions work together to produce it. The Patent Offi ce, constrained by available resources and laws, cannot solve all possible probOffi ce, constrained by available resources and laws, cannot solve all possible problems. Importantly, the Patent Offi ce is often forced by circumstances to operate in lems. Importantly, the Patent Offi ce is often forced by circumstances to operate in areas of legal and technological uncertainty, like making decisions on the patentareas of legal and technological uncertainty, like making decisions on the patentability of embryonic technologies at a point when prior art is not well developed. ability of embryonic technologies at a point when prior art is not well developed. It routinely takes many years before the courts begin to settle legal questions, and It routinely takes many years before the courts begin to settle legal questions, and before scientifi c progress resolves uncertainty about technological relationships. before scientifi c progress resolves uncertainty about technological relationships. As history has shown, the Patent Offi ce is routinely called upon to act before all As history has shown, the Patent Offi ce is routinely called upon to act before all possible bases of uncertainty are resolved. possible bases of uncertainty are resolved.
To those who speculate on the costs of moving quickly in the face of uncertainty, To those who speculate on the costs of moving quickly in the face of uncertainty, economics teaches us to consider the counterfactual-we cannot know what growth economics teaches us to consider the counterfactual-we cannot know what growth and innovation would have looked like in the face of a "wait and see" approach. In and innovation would have looked like in the face of a "wait and see" approach. In this context, the biotechnology industry offers a notable example. The US moved this context, the biotechnology industry offers a notable example. The US moved quickly to make artifi cial life forms patent-eligible in the quickly to make artifi cial life forms patent-eligible in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision (404 US 303 [1980] ), signaling that research in emerging fi elds ranging decision (404 US 303 [1980] ), signaling that research in emerging fi elds ranging from recombinant genetics to bioinformatics would be a sound investment. Other from recombinant genetics to bioinformatics would be a sound investment. Other industrialized nations have spent decades trying to catch up to the growth and value industrialized nations have spent decades trying to catch up to the growth and value that the United States created in this sector. that the United States created in this sector.
Conclusion
Such results refl ect the ongoing balance sought by the US patent system, a Such results refl ect the ongoing balance sought by the US patent system, a balance most recently struck with the innovative reforms of the America Invents balance most recently struck with the innovative reforms of the America Invents Act and the operational improvements of the Patent Offi ce to provide more robust Act and the operational improvements of the Patent Offi ce to provide more robust and transparent examination. And as the data in this article show, the recent track and transparent examination. And as the data in this article show, the recent track record at the Patent Offi ce of examining patents containing software-related claims record at the Patent Offi ce of examining patents containing software-related claims is an important counterweight to suggestions that the balance being struck is not is an important counterweight to suggestions that the balance being struck is not appropriate. Accordingly, the smart phone patent wars, like other large-scale patent appropriate. Accordingly, the smart phone patent wars, like other large-scale patent disputes in the past, may not refl ect a patent system that is broken, but rather a disputes in the past, may not refl ect a patent system that is broken, but rather a patent system that has helped to cultivate a groundbreaking body of advances in patent system that has helped to cultivate a groundbreaking body of advances in communications technology, advances that have invited market entry by competicommunications technology, advances that have invited market entry by competitors. Still, just as patents are a meaningful incentive to innovate, so also is the tors. Still, just as patents are a meaningful incentive to innovate, so also is the enforcement of patents a reasonable exercise in appropriating value from innovaenforcement of patents a reasonable exercise in appropriating value from innovation. That reality is at the heart of how the constitutional and legislative system of tion. That reality is at the heart of how the constitutional and legislative system of patent rights is intended to operate. patent rights is intended to operate.
The history of the US patent system refl ects a cycle of disruption-occasioned The history of the US patent system refl ects a cycle of disruption-occasioned by discontinuous technological change and market adaptation in its wake-and the by discontinuous technological change and market adaptation in its wake-and the ensuing search for a new institutional balance. The new balance has sometimes ensuing search for a new institutional balance. The new balance has sometimes arisen from market solutions such as cross-licensure in patent pools, or legislative arisen from market solutions such as cross-licensure in patent pools, or legislative solutions such as patent term reform and pre-grant publication, or judicial solutions solutions such as patent term reform and pre-grant publication, or judicial solutions such as revised doctrines of nonobviousness and adequate disclosure. The store such as revised doctrines of nonobviousness and adequate disclosure. The store of knowledge has grown, whether in textiles with the sewing machine, or in high of knowledge has grown, whether in textiles with the sewing machine, or in high technology with the laser, or in biotechnology with engineered bacteria. Consumers technology with the laser, or in biotechnology with engineered bacteria. Consumers have received not merely the now-inexpensive innovations of the past, but also a have received not merely the now-inexpensive innovations of the past, but also a reliable promise of innovation for the future. To be sure, such a commitment to reliable promise of innovation for the future. To be sure, such a commitment to the long-term benefi ts of innovation is a struggle against demands for access in the the long-term benefi ts of innovation is a struggle against demands for access in the short term, but it is one that eventually pays for itself. short term, but it is one that eventually pays for itself.
